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C ertain	 objects	 are	 naturally	 grouped	 together;	 they	 have	something	in	common.	Realists	claim	that	this	fact	demands	explanation.	For	illustration,	imagine	that	the	world	is	restrict-













Nominalists	 see	 no	 reason	 to	 posit	 universals.	 According	 to	 the	
nominalist,	 the	world	 contains	 only	 particular	 things.	 In	 this	 paper,	




ing	 further	 to	explain	 this	 commonality.	Armstrong	 (1978:	 16;	 1980)	
calls	a	nominalist	of	this	variety	an	ostrich,	since	she	purportedly	sticks	
her	head	in	the	sand	in	response	to	the	one-over-many-problem.1
The	ostrich	 says	 that	 she	does	not	posit	or	ontologically	 commit	
to universals.	 To	 support	 this	 claim,	 ostrich	 nominalists	 universally	













both	 are	 assessed	 by	Quine’s	 criterion.	As	 the	 ostrich	 presents	 the	
matter,	 the	realist’s	 theory	says	 that	 there	are	more	 things:	 it	posits	
universals	in	addition	to	the	particulars.
In	 this	 paper,	we’ll	 grant	 that	 standard	demands	 for	 explanation	
















application	of	Quine’s	 criterion	and	argue	 that	 this	 is	precisely	how	
Quine	himself	views	the	matter.
In	Section	I,	we	locate	the	disagreement	between	the	ostrich	and	































In	 ontology,	 the	 less	 the	 better.	 Therefore	 the	 realist	








trine	or	body	of	 theory,	 I	am	merely	asking	what,	according	 to	 that	 theory,	
there	is”	(Quine	1951b:	203–4).
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Type (a) disagreements




denies	 that	 these	 statements	entail	 a	 sentence	 saying	 that	 there	are	
universals.	 Thus,	 according	 to	 the	ostrich,	Quine’s	 criterion	dictates	




commits	 to	an	entity	 (i. e.,	 a	universal)	 for	every	predicate	deployed	
in	expressing	it.3	Others,	including	(perhaps	most	prominently)	Arm-









issue	 in	 large	 part	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 there	 are	 truth-maker	 theorists	who	
obviously	 view	 the	 truth-maker	 criterion	 (perhaps	wrongly)	 as	 a	 genuine	
alternative	to	Quine’s.	Thus,	Armstrong:	“To	postulate	certain	truthmakers	
for	 certain	 truths	 is	 to	 admit	 those	 truthmakers	 into	 one’s	 ontology.	 The	
complete	 range	of	 truthmakers	admitted	constitutes	a	metaphysics	 […].	 I	











not	 say,	 for	 instance,	 that	 Fido	 or	 Rover	 exists.	 Similarly,	 a	 theory	

















one	of	 three	places:	 (a)	 they	may	 agree	 about	which	 theory	 to	 en-
dorse	but	disagree	about	how	to	assess	the	ontological	commitments	
of	 this	 theory;	 (b)	 they	may	 disagree	 about	whether	 to	 endorse	 a	




We	will	 briefly	 survey	 these	disputes	 as	 they	pertain	 to	 the	de-
scription	of	the	box	world.	The	ostrich	and	the	realist	agree	that	this	
description	 is	fitting.	Yet	 they	disagree	about	whether	 this	 should	
lead	them	to	posit	universals.	We	will	suggest	that,	from	a	Quinean	
perspective,	the	most	important	disagreements	between	the	ostrich	
and	 the	realist	concerning	 the	description	of	 the	box	world	are	of	
type	(c).
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commits	to	red	surfaces,	since	the	sentence	entails	that	there	are	red	
surfaces.	On	 the	other	hand,	 one	who	 endorses	 ‘Surface	 S	 is	 green’	
ontologically	commits	to	green	surfaces.	Thus,	the	two	theories	have	






that	 follow	 ‘there	 are’.	 So,	 predicates	 are	 relevant	 to	 the	ontological	




















to	mean	logical	entailment.	So	 ‘what	must	exist	 if	…’	 just	means	 ‘what	 the	























their	theories	posit or	ontologically commit to	different	things.	Armstrong	





























In	 these	 sentences,	expressions	 such	as	 ‘Blue(…)’	occur	as	monadic	
predicates.	 They	 are	 inaccessible	 to	 quantification	 in	 standard	 first-
order	 logic.	This	means	that	there	is	no	sense	in	which	the	ostrich’s	
theory	entails	that	there	is	a	universal,	blue,	that	the	sphere	has.
A	 realist	 of	 the	 kind	under	 consideration	believes	 that	 it	 follows	
from	 the	description	of	 the	 box	world	 that	 there	 is	 such	 a	 thing	 as	
the	universal	blue.	Moreover,	she	believes	that	this	entailment	follows	












Some	 realists	would	 claim	 that	 the	ordinary	description	of	 the	box	
world	(properly	spelled	out)	simply	entails	that	there	are	universals.	
Ostriches	 deny	 this.	 When	 disagreements	 over	 entailments	 arise,	
Quinean	methodology	 dictates	 that	 a	 theory	 stated	 in	 ordinary	 (or	
even	scientific)	language	should	be	replaced	by	—	that	is,	regimented 
into	—	a	notation	that	makes	entailments	perspicuous.11	The	resulting	
sentences	 need	not	 uncover	 the	 “hidden	meaning”	 of	 the	 originals,	
but	should	constitute	the	best	 theory	that	captures	what	 is	scientifi-
cally	respectable	in	the	original	notation.12	Essentially,	disagreements	
of	 type	 (c)	 (disagreements	over	which	 inferences	 are	 valid)	 should	
be	 converted	 into	 disagreements	 of	 type	 (b)	 (disagreements	 over	
which	sentences	to	endorse).	Given	this	methodological	principle,	dis-
agreements	of	the	sort	that	occur	between	the	realist	and	the	ostrich	






universals.	 For	 discussions,	 see	 Parsons	 (1999),	 Lewis	 (2003),	 Lewis	 and	
Rosen	(2003),	MacBride	(2005),	and	Melia	(2005).	









our	 liking,	 that	fills	 those	 functions”	 (1960:	258–9).	Different	proposals	 for	
regimenting	a	theory	just are	different	theories.





















































Now	 for	 the	 crucial	question:	which	of	 these	 regimented	 theories	 is	
better?	Above,	we	mentioned	that	Devitt	argues	that	the	ostrich	nomi-
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Counting Principle 2  
(1)–(6)	 and	 (1*)–(4*)	 are	 the	 only	 ontological	 commit-
ments	of	the	respective	theories	relevant	to	determining	
which	is	more	parsimonious.








her	 theory’s	 ontological	 commitment	 to	 blue	 things,	 the	 ostrich	 ar-
gues,	is	not	in	fact	distinct	from	its	ontological	commitment	to	spheres	
and	its	commitment	to	cones.	We	will	argue	that	these	commitments	
are	 distinct	—	that	 according	 to	Quine’s	 criterion,	 a	 theory’s	 ontologi-
cal	 commitment	 to	 things of a given sort	 (blue	 things)	 is	distinct	 from	
its	commitments	to	specific	objects	(the	specific	cone	and	the	specific	
sphere)	even	if	the	objects	happen	to	fall	under	that	sort.	We	will	spend	







atorily basic	 sorts	weigh	more	heavily	 in	 the	assessment	of	ontologi-
cal	parsimony	than	ontological	commitments	to	things	of	other	sorts.	
Thus,	we	will	amend	Counting	Principles	2	and	3	as	follows:
Counting Principle 2*  







∃x∃y	IS(x, y)	 ∃x∃y	IS(y, x)
∃x	Universal(x)	 ∃x	Particular(x)
She	will	also	agree	that	these	entailments	generate	all	of	 the	ontologi-
cal	commitments	 relevant	 to	comparing	 the	 relative	parsimony	of	 the	














relative	 parsimony	 of	 realism	 in	 comparison	 to	 ostrich	 nominalism	
will	 be	 challenged.	These	 challenges	 can	best	be	 addressed	by	enu-
merating	the	principles	by	which	are	counting:
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we	 suppose	 that	 (3)	 the	ontological	 commitment	 to	 green	 things	 is	
distinct	from	(4)	the	ontological	commitment	to	cubes.	



























commit	 to	Fs	without	ontologically	 committing	 to	Gs,	 then	an	onto-
logical	commitment	to	Fs	is	distinct	from	an	ontological	commitment	
to	Gs.	From	(i)	 it	 follows	 that	a	 theory’s	 commitments	 to	 red	 things,	
green	things,	cubes,	and	so	on	are	different	from	its	commitments	to	
the	specific	things	that	happen	to	be	red,	green,	cubes,	and	so	on.	As	




Counting Principle 3*  
A	theory	with	many	ontological	commitments	 to	 things	






















































































implies	 that	 the	ostrich’s	way	of	 thinking	about	ontological	 commit-
ment	is	wrong,	and	that,	consequently,	we	should	think	of	a	theory’s	
ontology	as	including	the	things	of	various	sorts	that	it	says	there	are.	




















no	Fs.	There	are	no,	 say,	unicorns,	but	 some	 theories	say	 that	 there	












only	 if	 that	object	 is	 common	to	all	 those	 ranges.	And	
the	theory	is	ontically	committed	to	‘objects	of	such	and	
such	 kind’,	 say	dogs,	 just	 in	 case	 each	of	 those	 ranges	
contains	some	dog	or	other.	[Quine	1969b:	315]
This	 is	 also	 how	many	 of	Quine’s	 early	 expositors	 understood	 him.	
Church	—	echoing	 a	 point	 made	 in	 several	 places	 by	 Quine	 him-
self19	—	cites	as	an	advantage	of	Quine’s	criterion	that	it	does	mark	the	
distinction	between	a	commitment	to	things	of	a	sort	and	a	commit-










































































































This	 is	not	 to	say	 that	 ideological	differences	always	entail	differ-
ences	in	ontology.21	We	recognize	that	theories	can	differ	ideologically	
but	agree	ontologically.	For	example,	ideological	differences	between	
theories	may	 fail	 to	entail	ontological	differences	when	the	 theories	
are	intertranslatable.	The	idea	is	that	when	a	theory	can	be	translated	




























number	 of	 entities	within	 its	 ontology.	 The	 ideological	
20.	Lewis	(1992)	offers	a	related	distinction	between	whether things are	and	how 
they are.	 An	 ostrich	might	 attempt	 to	 apply	 this	 distinction	 to	 our	 discus-
sion	as	 follows:	what	a	 theory	says	about	whether things are	 is	 its	ontology 
and	what	a	 theory	says	about	how they are is	 its	 ideology.	This	 suggestion,	
however,	does	not	lend	any	support	to	the	thesis	that	a	theory’s	ontological	
commitments	are	given	by	the	specific	individuals	it	says	there	are.	Whether	
there	are	(e. g.)	dogs	or	things that are red	is	a	matter	of	whether things are,	and	
yet	doesn’t	concern	the	existence	of	any	specific	individuals.








that	 the	 realist’s	 universe	 contains	 more	 specific	 entities	 than	 the	
ostrich’s,	 since	 it	must	 also	 contain	 universals.	 In	 other	words,	 the	
minimal	model	of	the	realist’s	theory	is	larger	than	the	minimal	model	
of	the	ostrich’s	theory.	But	we	believe	that	one	should	compare	the	
ontological	parsimony	of	 two	 theories	by	comparing	 their	ontologi-
cal	commitments	to	things	of	various	sorts.	The	more	parsimonious	
theory	has	 fewer	of	 these	 commitments.	On	our	 view,	 the	number	
of	specific	entities	required	by	a	theory	matters	very	little,	if	at	all,	in	
the	assessment	of	ontological	parsimony.	 If	 this	 is	 correct,	 then	we	
should	compare	the	ostrich’s	and	the	realist’s	theories	by	determining	
whether	the	ontological	commitments	listed	as	(1)–(6)	are	greater	in	












claims	 involving	 terms	 like	 ‘Pegasus’:	 it	 should	be	open	to	a	 theorist	
to	reject	an	ontological	commitment	to	Pegasus	by	denying	 ‘Pegasus	
exists’.	Quine	worries	that	construing	‘Pegasus’	as	a	singular	term	ren-
ders	 this	position	unintelligible,	 and	 so	he	ultimately	holds	 that	all	
singular	terms	ought	to	be	eliminated	in	favor	of	either	(i)	descriptive	
the	ontology	of	the	theory	expressed	in	the	more	fundamental	idiom.	
However,	 the	ostrich	nominalist	 is	not	proposing	 that	 the	disparate	
predicates	used	in	the	expression	of	her	theory	(‘blue’,	‘sphere’,	‘green’,	







alism,	 though	more	 ontologically	 profligate,	 is	 more	 ideologically	
parsimonious	than	ostrich	nominalism.22	The	ostrich’s	theory	incurs	
an	ontological	 (and	not	purely	 ideological)	cost	 in	virtue	of	 saying	
that	there	are	things	of	more	sorts	than	the	realist’s	theory	does.	The	
ostrich	 chooses	 a	 theory	with	 things	 of	more	 sorts	 in	 its	 ontology	
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both	 qualitatively	 and	 quantitatively	 as	 regards	 each	 of	 these	 sorts	
than	a	theory	that	postulates	things	of	fewer	sorts,	as	does	realism.	It	
is	less	parsimonious	qualitatively	because	it	postulates	things	of	more	
sorts.	 It	 is	 less	parsimonious	quantitatively	 relative	 to	each	of	 these	
sorts	because	it	postulates	more	than	zero	instances	of	each	sort.
Why	would	a	philosopher	think	that	ontological	commitments	to	
specific	 individuals	count	 less	 in	 the	overall	assessment	of	ontologi-

























ory’s	 ontological	 commitments	 to	 specific	 individuals.	One	may,	 for	
example,	consider	 the	minimal	cardinality	of	any	model	of	a	 theory.	
We	will	 call	 the	 aim	of	minimizing	 this	 cardinality	quantitative parsi-
mony,	following	Lewis	(1973).	A	theory’s	quantitative	parsimony	is	the	







assigns	no	weight	 to	quantitative	parsimony	 in	 the	assessment	of	a	
theory’s	overall	parsimony.	
Daniel	Nolan	 (1997)	 argues	 against	 Lewis	 that	 quantitative	 parsi-
mony	is	a	theoretical	virtue	in	addition	to	qualitative	parsimony,	but	
even	he	would	concede	that	qualitative	parsimony	matters	more	than	










will	 raise	 provide	 reason	 to	 think	 that	 quantitative	 parsimony	weighs	 less	
in	the	assessment	of	ontological	commitment,	even	if	one	accepts	Richard’s	
suggestion.
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only	a	finite	number.	This	 is	not	 to	say	 that	 theism	 is	unjustified	or	
untrue,	 just	 that	 its	motivation	 cannot	 come	 from	considerations	of	
overall	parsimony,	as	we	think	is	conceded	by	many	theists.




















models.	The	 specific	worry	 is	 that	 any	first-order	 theory	with	only	
infinite	models	has	a	countable	model.	Thus,	any	two	theories	that	
posit	an	 infinitude	of	 things	will	be	equally	quantitatively	parsimo-
nious.	 It	 is	 this	 concern	 that	 leads	Nolan	 (1997)	 to	 reject	 the	 view	
that	quantitative	parsimony	simpliciter	is	a	theoretical	virtue.	Rather,	
he	endorses	the	more	complicated	“thesis	that	we	should	minimize	








fers	 to	posit	 one	universal	or	 twenty	 additional	blue	 things,	we	are	
certain	that	she’ll	choose	the	latter.	These	choices	reflect	a	preference	
structure	favoring	qualitative	over	quantitative	parsimony.
To	 take	another	example	 from	a	distant	field,	 consider	 the	differ-
ence	between	an	atheistic	 theory	of	 the	world	and	a	 theistic	 theory	
of	 the	world.	 The	 theistic	 theory	 needn’t	 commit	 to	 any	 specific	 in-








to	posit	additional	phenomena	 to	account	 for	 the	weather,	whereas	
theistic	theories	were	able	to	invoke	a	deity	or	deities.	Likewise,	cer-
tain	atheistic	theories	may	posit	that	there	is	no	beginning	in	time	and,	
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to	Φs	without	 thereby	having	an	ontological	 commitment	 to	Ψs.	 In-
deed,	‘Φ’	and	‘Ψ’	will	not	even	be	necessarily	equivalent.	For	brevity’s	
sake,	we	confine	a	fuller	elaboration	of	this	argument	to	a	footnote.27 
This	 suggests	 that	 there	 is	 a	 general	 problem	 with	 assessing	 a	
theory’s	overall	ontological	parsimony	by	counting	its	commitments	










On	 this	view,	 the	greater	 the	generality	of	a	 sort,	 the	more	 it	 counts	
in	 the	 assessment	 of	 ontological	 parsimony.	 This	 suggestion	might	




















Until	now,	we’ve	 suppressed	a	 complication	 in	our	discussion	of	on-







of	a	sort:	to spheres, green things, universals, particulars, instantiators,	and	
instantiated things.	Moreover,	we’ve	argued	as	if	these	are	the	only	onto-
logical	commitments	that	matter	in	the	assessment	of	the	comparative	




that	there	are	blue spheres, green cubes,	and	so	on.	 It	 therefore	has	an	
ontological	commitment	to	blue spheres,	an	ontological	commitment	to 
green cubes,	and	so	on.	But,	it	also	has	even	more	complex	ontological	
commitments:	it	entails	the	existence	of	green things such that there is a 
sphere:	∃x	(Green(x)	∧ ∃y	Sphere(y)).	Thus,	it	has	an	ontological	com-
mitment	to	green things such that there is a sphere.
The	realist	theory	has	its	own	additional	commitments.	It	is	commit-
ted	to	the	existence	of	things that instantiate green such that there are things 
that instantiate sphericality:	∃x	(IS(x, green)	∧ ∃y	IS(y, sphere));	it	there-
fore	has	an	ontological	commitment	 to	 things	of	 this	 sort.	Moreover,	
since	it	entails	‘∃x	IS(x, green)’,	the	theory	is	ontologically	committed	to	
things that instantiate green.
Simple	 combinatorial	 reasoning	 suggests	 that	 even	 very	 simple	
theories	have	ontological	 commitments	 to	 things	of	 infinitely	many	
	 	bryan	pickel	&	nicholas	mantegani A Quinean Critique of Ostrich Nominalism
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things	constitute	her	most	general	category.	But	this	just	means	that	
any	 assessment	 of	 the	 difference	 in	 ontological	 economy	between	
the	realist’s	theory	and	the	ostrich’s	would	require	some	further	way	
of	screening	which	sorts	matter	to	such	an	assessment.	This	reveals	




















30.	The	 issues	become	more	complicated	 for	an	 intensional	 language,	 such	as	
one	employing	modal	vocabulary.	The	fact	that	something	is	square	may	ex-
plain	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	a	square	or	a	circle.	However,	 it	cannot	explain	 the	
fact	that	the	thing	is	necessarily	a	square	or	possibly	not	a	square.	Attempts	
to	 reduce	 the	number	of	 explanatorily	basic	modal	 categories	 include	Car-





view,	 ontological	 commitments	 to	 things	 falling	 under	 general	 cate-






Privileging	 general	 categories	 in	 the	 assessment	 of	 parsimony	









28.	Quine	 proposes	 that	 the	 distinction	 should	 be	 abandoned:	 “Whether	 the	




29.	This	 may	 be	 what	 Melia	 (2005)	 means	 when	 he	 concedes	 that	 “sensible”	




















more	metaphysical	 conception	 of	 explanation	will	 agree	with	what	
we’ve	said,	since	she	will	likely	agree	that	an	object’s	falling	under	the	




tological	commitments	(i. e.,	commitments	to	blue things, spheres, green 
things, cubes, orange things,	and	cones).	Her	theory	entails	the	sentence	
‘There	is	an	x	such	that	x	is	blue	or	x	is	green’	and	is	thereby	committed	







We	 disagree	 with	 the	 ostrich’s	 opponent.	 In	 the	 ostrich’s	 theory,	












objects	and refuses to paraphrase	statements	containing	‘grue’	into	statements	
containing	 ‘blue’	and	 ‘green’	 thereby	 introduces	a	new,	explanatorily	basic	
sort	to	her	theory.	(Our	example	is	taken	from	Goodman	1983).
This	principle	seems	natural	to	us	since	we	think	that	the	fact	that	a	
molecular	predicate	 in	an	extensional	 language	applies	 to	an	object	
is	explained	by	the	distribution	of	atomic	predicates	that	apply	to	 it.	









rizing.	A	theory	that	appeals	to	the	categories	massed particle, electrically 
charged particle,	 and	 magnetized particle	 has	 more	 explanatorily	 basic	
sorts	than	one	that	appeals	only	to	the	sorts	massed particle	and	electro-
magnetically charged particle.	The	former	is	thus	less	parsimonious	than	
the	 latter,	 even	 if	 the	 latter	 requires	more	 claims	about	 the	distribu-
tion	of	mass	and	charge	(and	thus	more	explanatorily	non-basic	sorts)	
in	order	 to	account	 for	 the	observed	phenomena.	The	explanatorily	
non-basic	sorts,	on	the	other	hand,	seem	to	count	little	by	comparison.	
Once	they	have	agreed	to	the	existence	of	massed	particles,	scientists	
don’t	 fret	about	saying	that	 there	are	 things that are either massed par-
ticles or electromagnetically charged particles.	This	commitment	to	things 





















beloved.	 If	 the	theory’s	commitment	 to	 lovers of John carries	 the	same	
weight	as	these	two	commitments,	then	we	will	again	be	conceding	
that	quantitative	parsimony	weighs	the	same	as	qualitative.	For	 this	
reason,	we	 think	 that	 a	 theory’s	 commitments	 generated	 using	 rela-



























to	 things	 of	 two	 explanatorily	 basic	 sorts	 corresponding	 to	 the	 two	
positions	accessible	to	quantification	in	the	predicate.	That	is:
Dyadic Predicate  
A	theory	that,	for	some	atomic	dyadic	predicate	‘Q’,	entails	
‘∃x∃y Q(x, y)’	 incurs	 an	 explanatorily	 basic	 ontological	













are	 lovers of John,	 and	 those beloved by Sally,	 etc.).	We	 agree	 that	 the	
use	of	 ‘loves’	 and	other	 dyadic	 predicates	may	 generate	 ontological	
commitments	 to	 things	of	 these	additional	 sorts.	However,	we	hold	
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such	 truths.	Another	way	of	putting	 this	 is	 that,	 for	 the	
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